American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain
Theses and Dissertations

Student Research

2-1-2013

International agencies and the reform of food subsidies in Egypt
after the revolution of 2011
Marie Di Pietrantonio

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds

Recommended Citation

APA Citation
Di Pietrantonio, M. (2013).International agencies and the reform of food subsidies in Egypt after the
revolution of 2011 [Master's Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/945

MLA Citation
Di Pietrantonio, Marie. International agencies and the reform of food subsidies in Egypt after the
revolution of 2011. 2013. American University in Cairo, Master's Thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/945

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at AUC Knowledge
Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC
Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact thesisadmin@aucegypt.edu.

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND THE REFORM OF FOOD SUBSIDIES IN
EGYPT AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF 2011

A Thesis Submitted to the
Public Policy and Administration Department
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Global Affairs
By

Marie Di Pietrantonio

September 2013

The American University in Cairo

1

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND THE REFORM OF FOOD SUBSIDIES IN
EGYPT AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF 2011

A Thesis Submitted by
Marie Di Pietrantonio
to the Department of Public Policy and Administration
September 2013
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Global Affairs
has been approved by
Dr. Ibrahim Awad
Thesis Adviser
Affiliation ____________________________________________
Date ____________________
Dr. Magda Shaheen
Thesis First Reader
Affiliation ____________________________________________
Date ____________________
Dr. Khaled Abdel Halim
Thesis Second Reader
Affiliation ___________________________________________
Date ___________________
Dr. Hamid Ali
Public Policy and Administration Department Chair
Date ____________________
Dr. Laila El Baradei
Dean of GAPP
Date ____________________

2

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Department of Public Policy and Administration
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND THE REFORM OF FOOD SUBSIDIES IN
EGYPT AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF 2011
Marie Di Pietrantonio
Supervised by Professor Ibrahim Awad
ABSTRACT

Egypt has a very expensive and extensive food subsidy system representing a
heavy burden on the State’s public budget. At the same time, however,
these subsidies secure the livelihood of the most vulnerable part of the
Egyptian population. While this situation is not sustainable in its current
form, no agreement on the extent of the reforms needed and how they
should be conducted has yet been reached. This research aims to examine
the different viewpoints of stakeholders involved in this issue as well as it
intends to investigate the position of different international agencies on
food subsidies in general, and in Egypt in particular. Furthermore, does this
thesis look at how international agencies influence government decisions
on food subsidy reforms and it attempts to determine the other factors of
importance in this matter. The analysis is being based on publications from
these institutions and on interviews conducted with stakeholders involved
in food subsidies reforms. This allowed us to conclude that all actors agree
on the fact that the Egyptian food subsidy system needs to be reformed due
to its high cost and because it is not sufficiently targeted and suffers
important leakages. Regarding the changes that should be introduced, two
main positions can be identified; the financial institutions advocate for an
immediate switch to a less costly cash transfer system, while the UN
organizations, although not against cash transfers, argue that those are not
sufficient in protecting the livelihood of the poor in Egypt and are rather in
favor of keeping and improving the current system.
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1. Introduction
1.1. A historical background on food subsidies
The Egyptian food subsidy system can be divided into two components. The first one
is the subsidy for baladi bread1 (82% extraction) and flour. These products are
available for everybody and theoretically limited to 3 loaves a person, in practice,
however, there is no limitation on the quantity that can be purchased by the people.
Until recently, the government was providing flour at a subsidized price to the
bakeries which would bake the bread and sell it at a subsidized price of 5 Piasters
(less than 0.1 US$) instead of the 25 Piasters market price2. Bread is a major
component of the daily diet of Egyptians, which is well illustrated by its name in the
Egyptian dialect “aïsh” which also signifies “life”. This designation reflects how
central bread is in Egypt; Egyptians have a culture of bread which is found in every
meals. In 2009 subsidies on bread and flour represented 76.37% (10 billion EGP) of
the total expenditure for food subsidies.
The second component includes basic goods available at a very low price through a
ration card or a smart card. Each household possessing this card is entitled to specific
quotas of rice, cooking oil, sugar and tea that they can purchase in specific retail
outlets called “tamwin” which mean supply in Arabic. There are two types of ration
cards; the green card and the red card. While the first is aimed at the poorest
households and offers a higher subsidy rate, the second card targets less vulnerable
households which are entitled to a lower subsidy rate. In practice, 93% percent of the
card owners benefit from the green (full subsidized) card. This shows already the lack
1

Baladi bread is the typical Egyptian pita bread. Made of whole wheat, the loaves are about 15-20 cm
in diameter and 1-2 cm thick.
2 The recent reform on the supply chain of the baladi bread will be detailed in section 5.
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of targeting according to the economic level of the recipients in the system. The
expenses for rationed goods in 2009 was 3.1 billion EGP. (Ramadan and Thomas,
2011)

The system of consumer food subsidies has first been introduced during the Second
World War to help Egyptians in a time when goods were scarce and inflation high.
Subsequently food subsidies remained as a social safety net which was to guarantee a
stable price for certain food products in time of economic hardship and more
specifically to safeguard food-price inflation. It has been used to alleviate food
insecurity at the household level and to guarantee a minimum calorie intake for the
most vulnerable. (Ramadan and Thomas, 2011; Trego, 2011)
In the fifties, under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the country was heading towards
a system of state-led socialism and the subsidy program was expanded. As part of the
new system established, farmers were obligated to give off part or all of their harvest
at prices below the free-market price destined to redistribution. The government of
Nasser further expanded the food subsidy system in the 1960’s as part of a broader
consumer welfare program which was also subsidizing housing, energy, water, health,
education and other non-food goods like soap and cigarettes. During this period,
ration cards were introduced for a small number of items. The card was initially
designed at quantity rationing against commodity shortages and did not necessarily
involve price subsidies. Although it was quite extensive, the food subsidy program
under Nasser remained at a modest percentage of the state budget. (Ahmed et al.
2001) This can probably partly be attributed to the fact that producers had to bear a
part of the burden of the subsidies themselves.
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In 1970, when Sadat came to the power after the death of Nasser, the food subsidy
system was one of the few social policies that that were not reversed. The program
was even extended to 18 new food items including beans, lentils, frozen fish, meat,
and chicken, as well as rice and yellow maize. However, those subsidy expansions
became more and more costly due the international context. Because of Nasser’s
agricultural policy which was not encouraging production and the rising population,
Egypt became highly dependent upon wheat imports and suffered a lot from the world
wheat price which quadrupled between 1972 and 1973 leading to severe problems of
deficit. At this time, expenditures on food subsidies augmented drastically rising from
0.2 percent to 14 percent of the overall government expenditure. It was under Sadat
and his Infitah3 policy when Egypt first started with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in 1976 in order to negotiate the Egyptian external debt. An agreement would
require a package of economic reforms and a program of structural adjustment. The
IMF at this time identified the food subsidies as an area quite suitable for reducing
government expenses. After completing negotiations with the IMF in January 1977,
Sadat announced a suppression of the subsidies of basic foodstuffs. This decision
provoked violent “bread riots” which were threatening the stability of the regime in
such a way that the decision of cutting food subsidies had to be reversed. (Ahmed et
al. 2001; Trego, 2011)
When Hosni Mubarak took office in 1981, the burden caused by food subsidies on the
budget had become unsustainable and thus had to be reduced. Subsequently a careful
subsidy reform was conduced; gradually and without any previous announcements,
some subsidized items were removed from the ration card. The number of subsidized
items was reduced from nearly twenty to merely four in a dozen of years. Subsidized
3

The Infitah was President Sadat’s policy of opening the country to private investment.
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foods consumed mainly by higher income groups like meat, chicken, fish and others
were removed in a move to better target the poorest part of the population. It was also
under the reign of Mubarak that a partial ration card for higher-income households
was introduced and that the new-borns were not added on the card after 1989. In
1991, the Government of Egypt (GoE) concluded an agreement with the IMF and the
World Bank, known as Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program
(ERSAP), which increased the necessity of macroeconomic cleansing. (African
Development Bank Group, 2010) Food subsidies were also part of the targeted
reduction of public intervention on the free market. (Omar, 2012) It resulted that by
2000, only 67 percent of the population held a ration card (against 93 percent in
1990). In parallel, the government also addressed the bread subsidies; the size of the
loaf was decreased from 160 to 135 grams and the price increased gradually to be
until it reached five Piasters from its initial price of one Piaster. In order to implement
this smoothly, the method used was to introduce a more expensive and better quality
loaf and then progressively decrease its quality and then eliminate the cheapest loaf.
Thereby, the cost of food subsidies declined to 2.5 billion EGP in 1991/92 which
represented 5.5% of the total government expenditure. (Gutner 2002; Trego 2011)
In the twenty-first century, the food-subsidy system became primordial for the welfare
of the population as Egypt faced many periods of significant food price increase.
First, in 2003, the devaluation of the Egyptian Pound - the country switched from a
fixed to a flexible exchange rate - brought about an inflation of 28 percent.
Furthermore has the food market been more severely affected by a inflation in this
sector of nearly 38 percent. Then, in 2007–08, food prices rose in conjunction with
the international trend. Egypt as a net food importer was affected badly by this global
rise in food prices. (Trego 2011) Finally, in its current post-revolutionary situation,
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Egypt is facing a new phase of hardship with high inflation rates. The Egyptian
situation is therefore really complex and it can be seen that attempts to reform the
food subsidy system are very sensitive politically as well as socially. Numerous
reform attemps under Mubarak's regime are illustrative of the complexity of the issue.
After reducing the items and recipients of subsidies, he had to expand them again
after the inflation of 2003. A 10 Piasters loaf in addition to the 5 Piasters loaf of bread
was introduced to give extra affordable bread choices to the population. In 2004, the
government reintroduced new items on the ration card like rice, ghee, pasta, beans,
lentils, tea, and additional quantities of edible oil. These changes again entailed a raise
in expenditures for food subsidies. In 2004, in order to focus on economic reforms,
the President appointed Ahmed Nazif as a Prime Minister. As part of larger economic
reform, Nazif sought to reform the subsidy system. His cabinet studied ways to
distribute food subsidies to the needy population in a better-targeted manner. They
sought in particular to replace in-kind subsidies by cash transfers. (Trego, 2011) In
December 2007, Prime Minister Nazif announced the planned transition to a cashtransfer system for food subsidies. The response of the public to this proposal was
negative and Hosni Mubarak quickly reacted to the public uproar and proclaimed that
he would not reform the food subsidy system. The discussion on switching to a cash
subsidy system was thus postponed. The global food-price crisis also played a role in
dropping the idea of cash transfers.

(Trego, 2011) Previous expansion of the

subsidized food basket had also been revised as it appears they were not economically
efficient and were failing to alleviate poverty. Thus in 2006, the higher quality bread
has been eliminated as well as other commodities on the ration card; ghee, pasta,
beans, and lentils have been removed from the ration card and replaced with an
additional portion of sugar.
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1.2. Statement of the problem
Egypt is facing a deep economic crisis following the revolution of January 2011 that
led to the removal of President Hosni Mubarak who has been in power for 30 years.
The country’s foreign currency reserves are diminishing rapidly, dropping from $36
billion in 2011 to $14 billion at the end of March 2013. Also, the budget deficit
reached 11 percent of the GDP compared to about 7 percent in 2010. (Terra LawsonRemer, 2013) Such a critical economic situation rekindles the government’s
responsibility to take measures to rebalance the fiscal deficit. The reforms needed
would encompass two main aspects: the increase of revenues as well as the reduction
of public expenditure. In 2008/09, food subsidies accounted for 6.1 % of the total
government expenditure (Korayem, 2013) and nearly 2% of the GDP. (World Bank,
2013) This sector counts then for a relevant share of the government spending and is
therefore not sustainable in its current form.
Reforming food subsidies is, however, quite a challenge for any post-revolution
governments. Conflicting pressures are complicating the issue: on the one side are
international financial agencies, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank (WB) pressuring for strong reforms that include expenditure reductions,
which would probably affect food subsidies. Those reforms are deemed necessary if
Egypt wants to accede to the IMF’s $4.8 billion loan, which would secure the
country’s access to other loans from international banks as well as reassure investors.
On the other side stands the Egyptian population, the poor in particular, that are
already facing a deterioration of their living conditions due to the desolate economic
situation of the country. The Egyptian population’s firm position on this issue can be
illustrated by the 2011 revolution’s main slogan which was “bread, freedom and
11

social justice!” Since food subsidies ensure food security for certain Egyptian
households, and on the other side a mean of redistribution, cutting them might be
perceived as going against two of the three fundamental demands the Egyptian people
voiced during the January 2011 revolution. This means that reforms on food subsidies
might lead to revolts and “bread riots”, like it has already been the case in Egypt in
the past. More popular revolts are barely affordable for any of the successive
governments, which are likely to be fragile, highly contested and facing continuous
turmoil. Under the reign of Morsi who hails from the Muslim Brotherhood, the IMF
was pushing the government of Egypt (GoE) to adopt additional economic reforms
(Ahram, 03.04.2013a) while the opposition speaking out against those reforms and
organized protests against the IMF loan, claiming it would be too much of a burden
for the country. (Ahram, 03.04.2013b)
The main issue at hand is that there is an acknowledged need for reform when it
comes to food subsidies to help cut government expenditure. However, the different
parties involved in taking decision – the government, the Egyptian people, and
international organizations – have different interests regarding this issue and it will be
very difficult to find an agreement on how this reform should be conducted. This is
why any successive government will find itself in the middle of at least two opposing
views and pressures concerning the food subsidy policy it has to adopt. However,
international organizations do not only play a pressure role, agencies like the World
Food Programme (WFP) mainly or the Food Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the
United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) are also providing assistance to the
government and, at the same time, to the population. They do not, however, have the
instruments to impose anything on the Egyptian government and thus rather play a
role of technical assistance.
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This issue is then regrouping three levels; society, domestic policy and global policy.
It is therefore an interesting study case of the interaction of these three levels in the
decision making process. In order to do so, this thesis will first investigate the need
for food subsidies in Egypt and how this sector can be reformed. It will then examine
the position of different international agencies on the food subsidy policies and reform
focusing on the IMF, the World Bank and the WFP. It will also seek to examine to
what extent they affect the Egyptian government’s decision making process and how
the negotiations are being conducted. It focuses thus mainly on the process that on the
content of reform.
The objective is to get a clearer idea on the matter of food subsidy reform process in
Egypt. The thesis seeks to understand the settings for policy making in this field, with
a particular attention on the global environment and the influence of international
organizations.
To conduct this research, a first part of this study has provided a background on the
historical context of the Egyptian food-subsidy system, including the role of foodprice inflation, and the affect of the politico-economic situation. In the subsequent
chapter, a literature review on food security and the role of food subsidies will be
given in order to understand the raison d’être of these subsidies. This will be linked
with the duty of the State toward its citizens and the social contract. An economic
perspective will also be included in the impact of subsidies on food prices and the
demand and supply equilibrium. In the second part of this chapter, food subsidy
policies in Egypt will be examined focusing on the need for food subsidies in the
current situation to ensure food security for the Egyptian households and on the
necessity for a reform of the food subsidy system. The third part will look into what
has been written about the international organizations and their policies toward food
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subsidies in order to understand what is their position in this regard. In the fourth part,
the data collected during the field investigation will be described. They will then be
analyzed in relation to the problematic in the fifth part. A conclusion will bring a
synthesized answer to the research question.

2. Hypothesis

As a point of departure, I assume that food subsidies in Egypt are necessary, given the
level of poverty in the country. Researchers estimate that 25 per cent of the Egyptian
population lives below the poverty line. (Abdel-Razek, 2011) They can therefore not
afford food at a market price that is not only unstable but also significantly higher
than subsidized prices. The food-subsidy system in Egypt, however, needs to be
reformed since it benefits mostly the richest quintile with access to subsidies, while
some of the most needy household are excluded from the subsidy system altogether.
(World Bank, 2012) Thus the subsidy system in Egypt needs to develop a strategy
that targets the most vulnerable households rather than the not so needy ones, not least
because the burden that food subsidies are imposing on the state's budget, already in
deficit, is unsustainable for the government.

Regarding the international organizations, I assume that the financial organizations
are in favor of cuts in food-subsidies in order to ‘clean up’ the state budget. Although
IMF does not give fixed conditions for its loans, it expects substantial budgetary
measures and subsidies are form a significant part of the expenditures that are most
suitable – or the less unsuitable - for cuts. They have thus a fiscal approach of the
14

problem. UN agencies, quite the contrary, are more concerned about human
development and protection indexes. It can be assumed that the WFP will give
priority to households’ food security. Their concerns are focused mainly on the
nutritional aspects. The influence of the IMF on the Egyptian government can
expected to be quite strong, since its recommendations are preconditions for its loan.
However, the government is reluctant to engage in important reforms that might
compromise its fragile stability. On the other side, The WFP, FAO and the UNDP
have no leverage towards the Egyptian government. They can, however, influence it
and provide much needed assistance and expertise.
The problematic of reforming food subsidies is further complicated by the existence
of two dominating but conflicting rationales; the one focused on cutting expenditures,
in order to balance the budget, advocate for a minimal subsidy program; while the
others, who care about the living conditions of the people, defend a minimal living
standard for the most vulnerable part of the population. The government is quite
obviously stuck between those two rationales, whose contradictory character
paralyzes any substantial solution to the problem of food subsidies that would be
acceptable for the population and financially sustainable for the government.
Although the pressure of IMF on the government for reforms of the subsidy system is
strong, the successive governments are reluctant to start such a sensitive reform that
might cost them a lot politically.

3. Methodology
In order to investigate the position of international agencies on food subsidies and
how they influence Egyptian politics, a desk and qualitative research will be
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conducted based on reports and publications from international organizations and
semi-directed interviews. A focus will be placed on the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) because of the role they play in shaping government
expenditure and macroeconomic reforms. On the other hand, United Nations
organizations like the World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) and to a
smaller extent UNICEF will be analyzed due to their involvement in food security
issues.

A first part of the research was conducted using published data including reports from
the pre-cited organizations, academic research, newspaper articles as well as official
decrees and statements. In a second stage, interviews were conducted with officials
from the above mentioned agencies, with the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade as
well as with experts. The information provided by the interviews will complete the
data collected previously. The analysis of all those data combined will lead to
conclusions that answer the research questions.
A shortcoming in the research is however the lack of possibilities for interviews from
a larger rank of ministries or governmental officials in reason of their reluctance to
talk about this sensitive issue and also because of the lack of possibilities to get into
contact with such officials.
Another weakness of the research is that it does not bring the point of view from the
IMF and WB through a personal interview, I tried however to reflect their opinion a
well as possible from a large panel of publication from those agencies.
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4. Literature review
4.1 The rational of food subsidies
4.1.1. Food security and role of subsidies
Food security is defined by the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) as: “when
all people, at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient safe and
nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and
healthy life. The four pillars of food security are availability, access, utilization and
stability.” (CFS, 2012, p.4) Consumer food subsidies seek to address the three last
pillars, while the first pillar is included in the government’s agricultural policy. The
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) describes food subsidies as “a common
method of attempting to reduce food insecurity” (FAO website). They are indeed
commonly motivated by household-level food security concerns. Those consumeroriented food subsidy programs, mainly found in developing countries, were launched
with the goal of assuring consumers access to a specified quantity of one or more food
commodities at stable prices fixed by the government. Such a guarantee is a key
consideration for vulnerable households, since price fluctuations, due to global or
domestic factors, is the main reason for food insecurities. Many of these programs
were initiated or expanded during war times or following poor harvests or extreme
foreign exchange crises. The principal purpose of the strategy, when initiated, was
clearly one of reducing uncertainty at a household-level concerning the ability to
access a minimum amount of basic food staples. (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988) Consumer
subsidy programs and policies’ roles differ among countries and over time. In most of
the cases the goal is akin to the following: to improve the real purchasing power of all
17

or certain groups of consumers by making some basic food items available at belowmarket prices; to ensure minimum calorie and nutrient efficiencies for “at risk”
population groups like children and pregnant women or larger groups like “the poor”;
to guarantee social and political stability especially in countries where the government
has little legitimacy; as a form of partial wage compensation for the low salaries of
the Egyptian population. (Adams, 2000; Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988) It has been
observed (Pinstrup Anderson, 1988) that food consumption by low-income
households is being affected by food subsidies, which lower food prices and thus raise
the relative incomes and food security of the households. The income and price
elasticity for staple foods tend to be larger among the poorest. This means that food
price subsidies result in increasing household food consumption and their caloric
intake.

When food subsidies are regarded from a food security perspective, it is important to
mention that food subsidy programs can also affect the food availability in the country
by affecting agricultural production. In fact, under Nasser, farmers participated in
agricultural cooperatives which mandated obligatory delivery of part or all of their
production at prices below the free-market price. Growth in wheat production was
slow during this time, whereas population growth was fast. It resulted that in 1963
wheat imports exceeded domestic production and lead to an increase in the balance of
payment’s deficit. In the early 1980s, Egypt was only 20 percent self-sufficient in
wheat, an incidence that had to be reversed, this is why the government began to
address domestic agricultural production. In the mid-1980s, a national program started
to distribute high-yielding long-spike wheat varieties to farmers, substantially
increasing yields. In the 1990s, the agricultural sector was liberalized, which resulted
18

in further increases in productivity. Egypt increased its relative domestic production
so that by 2000 it was 50 percent self-sufficient in wheat. (Croppenstedt et al. 2006)

4.1.2. Duty of the state and social contract
The notion of social contract is defined in political philosophy as an “agreement,
between the ruled and their rulers, defining the rights and duties of each”. Subsidy
policies need also to be studied in the framework of the state’s social policy and the
social contract as well as its relationship with the market. It is therefore important to
address the literature concerning the relationship between the market and the state as
well as the state and its citizens. The market mechanism is defined by Dasgupta
(1993) as a “resource allocation mechanism in which the State restricts its activities in
the socio-economic sphere to facilitating the operation of private markets. This it does
by developing and enforcing commercial laws [...], protecting private property rights
[...], and so forth.” The author emphasizes, however, that generally, under the terms of
the social contract, the state is obliged to do more than merely sustain the market
mechanism. State intervention is indeed often necessary to balance dangers stemming
from the free market that might leave aside the less competitive. The state can ensure
a minimal welfare level for its citizens. Its main goal is to assist the disadvantaged and
regain a balance between efficiency and equity. Welfare system or social policies are
concerned with the public provision of goods and services. Interventions are aimed to
guarantee access to a range of basic goods and services to improve wellbeing and
achieve socially defined objectives. This can be provided through different
mechanisms such as direct state provision, publicly financed payment systems, and
government mandates to other organizations to provide services and to reduce
insecurity or insure against risk in order to help vulnerable households or individuals
19

to resist shocks, such as, serious illnesses, disability or unemployment and to smooth
consumption and income. The extent of the state intervention and the issue of state
versus market have been in the center of the economic development discussions for
many decades. (Omar, 2013) Welfare systems are to be seen as part of the social
contract between the state and its citizens where the state engages in providing certain
goods and services in return for more or less higher taxes paid by the citizens and low
revenues. Also, the provision of these goods and services provide the state with a
certain political legitimacy. In the decades after World War II, the welfare system has
reached a relative level of maturity in many of the developed countries. During this
period, most industrialized Western democracies had to adopt policies of income
security and have provided their citizens with free or subsidized services in many
areas such as education, health, housing and employment. (Omar, 2013)

In Egypt, it is mainly during Nasser’s rule that a social contract between state and
society began to emerge, emphasizing redistribution and equity as key principles
justifying mechanisms such as consumer food subsidies. (Yousef, 2004) Yousef
(2004) defines the type of social contract that was found in Egypt and other MENA
countries from de 1940's to the 1970's as an “interventionist-redistributive social
contract” which came with a “centralized, hierarchical, and tightly regulated
corporatist structure of interest representation in the first decade after independence”
(p.7). He sees this kind of system as a consequence of the extreme poverty that
prevailed in the first half of the 20th century and very meager health care, education,
nutrition and life expectancy. In Egypt, consumer subsidies became an implicit part of
the social contract between the population and its government. It is part of the
government’s commitment to provide job opportunities and a minimum standard of
living at affordable prices to alleviate the dire economic situation of many households
20

against accepting limitations on freedoms and ensuring political stability. It
contributes therefore to the survival of the government and any attempt to reduce or
eliminate this service might be perceived as a breach to the government’s
commitment for social provision and would break this social contract. This would
generate unrest of a population whose living became a hardship and who is expecting
a basic ration of food from its ruler. (Omar, 2013)

4.1.3 Food subsidies and market function
From an economic point of view, food subsidy programs imply that government
intervention in the free market is such that food prices are kept lower to some or all
consumers than they would be without it. There are different conflicting economic
approaches regarding food subsidies and their implication on the market’s
functioning. In the early 1980’s, the neoclassical approach was most prevalent as it
was the system encouraged by the Bretton Woods Institutions and formed part of the
“Washington Consensus”. Those financial institutions would incite developing
countries to remove general subsidies and replace them with targeted subsidies in the
framework of the Structural Adjustment and Economic Stabilization policies
(SAESP) (Dinit and Lippit). Those SAESP were widely recommended to developing
countries in the 1980’ and 1990’ in order to receive IMF and WB’s structural
adjustment loans. Reductions of general subsidies were advocated as important
preconditions for such loans in order to reduce the deficit and improve the efficiency
through “getting the prices right”. The main theoretical bases of those policies are the
following macroeconomic paradigms; Supply-side; Rational Expectations and New
Neoclassical Political Economy. (Dinit and Lippit) First, the Supply-Side approach

21

emphasizes that state intervention leads to more expenditure than tax revenues; it
implies that expenditures should be borne by higher taxes. However, high taxes have
a negative effect on investments and on economic growth. If investment goes down,
the tax base diminishes, which in turn leads to lower taxes revenues. It is therefore
important to keep a tax level that would generate an optimal margin of profit. The
Rational Expectation theory puts the accent on the capacity of the market to regulate
itself and to settle the imbalances to get to an optimal equilibrium. So, any state
intervention is not only harmful but also does not have the expected effect due to the
prediction of economic institutions that would take measures to prevent negative
effects. Finally, the New Neoclassical Political Economy approach assumes that state
agencies are not different from private agencies in the sense that they are also
following their personal interest and trying to maximize their profits. All kind of
economic interventions follow this target. It would therefore be better to remove all
those interventions through liberalizing and privatizing and minimizing the state role.

To summarize, from the previous perspectives, we understand that any kind of state
intervention in the economy is perceived as harmful, this means that for them, the
economic approach to follow has to be “getting the prices right” including for food
and energy, which entails removing general subsidies which bring price distortions
and misallocations. The principle behind those theories and the SAESP is that
building a better macroeconomic environment will encourage investment, which will
bring growth, create jobs and increase salaries, which altogether will bring a poverty
reduction. It could initiate a virtuous circle that would bring more growth and less
poverty each round.
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However, in the 1980's, such policies have lead to a failure of capital accumulation
due to a decline in public expenditure and the rise of poverty due to the liberalization
of food prices and subsequent decrease of the real wage of households. (Mohan et al,
2000) Furthermore was it hardly criticized for its disastrous social repercussions. One
of the most important and influential critiques came from UNICEF in its 1987 annual
report entitled: “Adjustment with a human face”, which states that structural
adjustment policies implemented in developing countries were harmful for the
population. It criticizes the lack of consideration for the poor of the adjustment
programs and denounces catastrophic repercussions on the population in most of the
countries where such programs had been implemented. UNICEF’s campaign for an
adjustment that would protect the vulnerable parts of society had a certain influence
on the Bretton Woods Institutions, which slightly changed their policies thereafter. In
a speech at the US Chamber of Congress in 1990, Michel Camdessus, managing
director of the IMF, recognized that a “responsible adjustment program must take
these effects into account, particularly as they impinge on the most vulnerable or
disadvantaged groups of society”. (Stewart & FitzGerald, p.18) Ever since, the IMF
has argued for cash transfers in order to compensate the food price increase for the
most vulnerable people. It is nevertheless important to investigate the effect of
consumer food subsidies on the free market. Particularly, the food subsidy programs
that affect the market in three sectors: the agricultural sector, on inflation and on the
foreign trade. The effect on the agricultural sector varies widely according to the type
of food subsidy program implemented. Two main types of programs can be
distinguished; the explicit and the implicit consumer food subsidies. In the explicit
food subsidies, it is mainly the government that bears the cost of the program because
it makes the budgetary outlays. On the other hand, implicit food subsidies are more
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borne by the producers whose supply prices are held down. (Valdès, 1988) This was
the kind of system that was implemented under Nasser where producers’ prices were
artificially kept low. Explicit consumer food subsidies do not necessarily have adverse
effects on agricultural incentives. Moreover, such subsidies can enhance the
purchasing power of consumers who will then increase their demand for food and
thus provide opportunities for increasing prices for producers. Regarding implicit
consumer food subsidies, they might be harmful to producers who are usually
constrained to maintain artificially low supply prices, which in turn result in a
negative incentive for the production that entails less production and less farm
income. (Pinstrup Andersen, 1988) As demonstrated previously, this has been the case
in Egypt under Nasser’s rule when farmers had to deliver part or all of their
production at low price which had the consequence of slow growth of wheat
production. In the late 1970's, however, the burden of financing low food prices for
consumers was gradually shifted from farmers to the government. (Pinstrup Andersen,
1988) Yet, Pinstrup Andersen (1988) specifies that negative effects may occur also
with explicit types of subsidies if the part of the budget that the government spends
those subsidies on would have been spent on public investment in agricultural
infrastructure, technology development or research instead. A study of Egyptian food
subsidies conducted by Scobie (1988) found, that while gross fiscal support to the
agricultural sector rose with increasing fiscal costs of food subsidies during the late
1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the share of public investment in agriculture was
reduced. It can, however, not be identified whether the reduction was caused by an
increasing part of the budget spent on food subsidies. Scobie did not investigate the
eventual stimulation to increase productivity resulting from a higher demand in the
case of explicit subsidies. In case the demand is raised, with prices kept at the same
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level, this could indeed push the producer to innovate and invest in order to respond to
a higher demand. Furthermore, the recent policy of the GoE to raise wheat
productivity contradicts Scobie's assumption. Factually, it is not in the interest of the
government, which has to supply subsidized food items, to reduce investment for
production because this might create more dependency on imports and international
price fluctuation. It is not clear whether and to what extent food subsidies have an
influence on the inflation rate. However, Prinstrup Andersen (1988) has a hypothesis specifying that it does not always work in this way - that if the changes in subsidy
cost are reflected in similar changes in government deficit spending, this deficit
spending might be financed through increased money supply and in this case the
subsidies might cause inflation. Thus, while the prices of the subsidized goods are
kept low, the prices of other goods will increase and the net benefits derived by
consumers might be lower than the value of the transfer. This causal-effect relation is
often overlooked in the literature and the debate regarding food subsidies. Indeed,
governments often justify subsidies as a measure to control food-price inflation by
keeping food prices low. Empirical evidence of the inflationary effects of food
subsidies is, however, insufficient. Results from Egypt and Korea indicate that the
effect can be large; it was found that a 10 percent increase in food subsidies in Egypt
would result in a 5 percent increase in the rate of inflation. (Prinstrup Anderson, 1988)
Andersen is thus not so clear on this particular aspect; there seems to be a lack of
evidence to develop a clear stand on the influence of subsidies on inflation rates. The
FAO (Website) also highlights that food subsidies ’distort’ the consumption habits of
a population. Subsidies on food items can lead to an increase in the consumption of
particular food items that cannot always be produced domestically. Thereof resulting
imports might expand consumption patterns, which could then shift away from the
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local staple and disturbs the balance of payments. Furthermore would this be reflected
in the availability of foreign exchange for other imports. It has been estimated that a
10 percent increase in imported food in Egypt would lead to a 1 or 2 percent fall in
industrial production due to a decrease of raw material imports that provides the
needed amount of foreign exchange for food imports. (Scobie, 1988) Implicit
subsidies involve even greater consequences on foreign trade as, in addition to the
increased demand, they usually reduce domestic supply, thus reducing selfsufficiency. This implies decreasing exports and increasing imports, which raise the
demand for foreign exchange and thus enhance the pressure on the exchange rate.
(Prinstrup Andersen, 1988) Implicit subsidies are therefore known to negatively affect
domestic production. While there is no evidence on the exact repercussion of explicit
subsidies on production, it can be inferred that they have a rather good influence on
domestic production.

4.2. Food subsidy policies in Egypt
4.2.1. Poverty and need for subsidies
Egypt's poverty rates increased from 19.6 percent of the population in 2004/2005 to
25.2 percent in 2010/2011 (IFPRI et al., 2013). This resulted in an increase in the
prevalence of food insecurity of 17.2 percent, which equals 13.7 million people
suffering from food insecurity in 2011, from 14 percent of the population in 2009
(WFP & CAPMAS, 2003). In the last decade, the country suffered from a succession
of crises including the avian flu epidemic in 2006, the food, fuel and financial crisis in
2007-2009 and the difficult macroeconomic situation following the revolution of
2011. Those factors pushed twice as many people into food insecurity than those
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moving out of it in 2011 (IFPRI et al., 2013). The rural Upper Egypt is particularly
affected by poverty, with the poverty rate being as high as 51.5 percent (Adams and
al., 2010). Also, chronic child malnutrition has also been rising in the past decade. By
2008, about one third of Egyptian children under the age of five were stunted, this rate
is considered “high” according to the standards of the WHO. (IFPRI et al., 2013) This
is mostly critical given that child malnutrition, particularly in the first 1000 days of
life, irreversibly affects brain/cognitive development, productivity and health through
adulthood. (Save the Children, 2012)
In Egypt, food insecurity is rather an issue of access to food than availibility of food.
Thus, there is a strong correlation between poverty and poor access to food. This
makes food subsidies a crucial issue in a country with such a high rate of poverty.
The government of Egypt is improving access to food for its population by its food
subsidy program. Despite their shortcomings, subsidies are still highly needed by the
population. They play an important role in protecting the poor against high food
prices. Also, it has been estimated that a removal of the food subsidies would increase
the poverty rate from 25.2 percent to about 34 percent. (Adams et al., 2010) In
addition to their role as a contribution to food intake in households, the most
important immediate benefit of food subsidies is the positive effect on real incomes of
households. The income transfers occur through lower food prices. Food subsidies
account for a significant portion of poor households’ net incomes. In fact, the poor
spend a great part of their household budget on food; which means that a change in
the price of food commodities has a bigger impact on their purchasing power than it
has for middle and upper class households. Thus, a reduction of 10 percent in food
prices should result in an increase of 6 to 8 percent in the real income of the poorest
decile of the population, while on the other hand, the real income increase would only
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be 1 to 3 percent for the richest decile. Also, in several of the programs analyzed, the
value of the food subsidies received by low-income households account for 15 to 25
percent of their net incomes. (Pinstrup Andersen, 1988)

4.2.2. Need for reform
The literature on food subsidies in Egypt agrees on the necessity for reform of the
Egyptian food subsidy system. The World Bank (2010) published a report that
includes an overview on the issue and provides a wide analysis of the current food
subsidy system’s shortcomings. It emphasizes that the system suffers from significant
leakages and that it is not targeted enough. A focus on those two deficiencies could
allow the government to reduce its high expenditure in food subsidies significantly.
In the fiscal year of 2008/2009 the cost of food subsidies reached LE 21.1 billion, a
figure that equals 2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). However, these
costs include the above-mentioned leakages, which the World Bank estimated to be of
around LE 5.5 billion at a national level, which represents 28 percent of total food
subsidies. The losses for baladi bread and baladi wheat flour subsidies - which
represent two thirds of all subsidies - were estimated at LE 3.7 billion which is
equivalent to 31 percent of the cost of those subsidies.
The Egyptian program of food subsidies reaches almost the whole population.
Subsidized baladi bread is distributed through bakeries, which are open to everyone.
In 2008/09, 81 percent of Egyptian households were purchasing baladi bread, a figure
that does not vary very much according to expenditure groups: the share of
households that purchase subsidized bread in the poorest quintile - 78 percent – is
lower than in the tree middle quintiles and is almost equivalent to the share of the
richest quintile - 77.7 percent. Also, for the three middle quintiles this share is lower
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for the 2nd quintile than for the two richer ones - 81 percent, 83.8 percent and 84.9
percent accordingly. Similarly, 67.6 percent of Egyptian households held a ration card
in 2008/2009. In the case of ration cards, however, the share of the population holding
it regresses from the poorest to the richest quintile – 76 percent and 57 percent
respectively. Yet, according to the World Bank, (2010, p.20) “while 38 percent of the
poorest two quintiles do not benefit from ration cards, two-third of the richest quintile
have a ration card”.

Table 1: Share of households purchasing subsidized baladi bread

Source: World Bank 2010

Table 2: Share of households holding Ration Cards

Source: World Bank 2010

The World Bank (2010) calculated that by reducing the overall leakages to 10 percent
and by excluding the richest 40 percent of the population from receiving subsidies,
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LE9.5 billion or 48.6 percent of the food subsidies could be saved, while with
excluding the richest 60 percent, 12.3 billion or 62.8 percent of food subsidies could
be saved. Part of it could then be redistributed to the poorest quintiles. The exclusion
of people who consider themselves as entitled to subsidies, however, might jeopardize
the whole system. It could be interesting to investigate to which extent subsidies
would lose their legitimacy or popular support if they did not benefit of the entire
population anymore.

4.3. International agencies' role
4.3.1. International Monetary Fund and World Bank
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has a dark past with social policies. Their
structural adjustments policies imposed on all too many developing countries in the
1980's, as a way to control the growing budgetary imbalance and stagnation, had
catastrophic repercussions on the most vulnerable parts of those countries’ population.
Most of the adjustment programs followed the idea of the trickle-down effect, a model
that holds that the money of the wealthy benefit poorer members of society merely by
improving the economy as a whole. In congruence with this way of thinking, no effort
was made to prevent the further deterioration of the situation of the vulnerable in the
short run. (Cornia et. al. 1987)
In Egypt, as in number of other countries like Nigeria Morocco and Peru, food
subsidy reductions were introduced without paying attention to the structural
disjunction it would create, and eventually led to civilians rioting and threatening
government stability. (Muralidharan, 1991) Although the IMF does not officially
oppose food subsidies, it still holds the opinion that subsidies are not suitable for the
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free market because its redistributive mechanisms distort the good functioning of
"perfect competition between free economic agents". (Muralidharan, 1991) The IMF
and its Bretton Woods partner the World Bank are in favor of highly targeted
subsidies only if they are really indispensable. This means that subsides should only
reach the most needy and exclude the ones that can bear the market price of the
product. (Muralidharan,1991)
The IMF for example, insisted on cutting subsidies in West and Central African
countries; claiming that subsidies were not effective in directly helping the poor and,
besides that, only really foster smuggling and corruption (Ahmed, 2011).
Furthermore, IMF estimates show that overall food and fuel subsidies accounted for
more than 8 percent of the GDP in Egypt and Jordan in 2011. They state that
generalized price subsidies in the MENA region are not very effective in helping the
poor because they only make out a relatively small portion of the overall spending on
subsidies. According to Nemat Shafik, IMF Deputy Managing Director, “it’s a myth
that generalized energy subsidies could help the poor as only 20 percent of those
subsidies reach the poor while the remaining 80 percent benefit the non-needy,” (IMF
Survey online, 2012) They defend the need to replace “wasteful price subsidy
regimes” that do not fulfill their mission since they benefit mainly the wealthy, with
better-targeted social safety nets that protect the poor and are more cost effective. The
money saved with this change could then be invested in infrastructure, education, and
health, which would benefit the population as a whole.
The IMF estimates indicate that cash transfer systems could result in about 50–75
percent of spending reaching the bottom 40 percent of the population, which would be
far more effective than the actual 20 percent of the amount spent on subsidized fuel
and 35 percent to subsidize food items. (IMF Survey online, 2012)
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Since its self-defined mission is to “reduce poverty and support development” (World
Bank website), the World Bank is more focused on poverty reduction and
development. However it has an ideology similar to the IMF; the World Bank used to
require adjustment program as a condition for its loans. In 1999, after the controversy
about the effect such programs have on poverty, it changed its loan process by giving
more autonomy to the government and a greater say to civil society on their antipoverty strategies. In the same year, the Bank launched its Comprehensive
Development Framework (CDF), which stressed “the importance of non-economic
development such as nutrition, health and education status”. (Deacon, 2007, p.29) As
seen before, the World Bank (2010) is in favor of reforms aiming at better targeting
food subsidies to reach the poor and reduce the leakages that could both bring
significant savings in the system’s expenditures. It does, however, not advocate for a
total abolition of food subsidies. It recognizes their importance as a factor of poverty
reduction and mitigation, especially the baladi bread which is primordial in the
Egyptians’ diet. It also emphasizes on the good aspect of food subsidies being the
government’s ability to purchase those goods at a lower price than in the free market,
which means that the consumer’s benefit is higher than the government’s subsidy
cost. This point is however disputable because the system suffers from leakages and
weak targeting. Finally, they argue that subsidies are seen as “part of compensation
mechanism for low level salaries and wages” and as the ‘most concrete benefits [they]
receive from government spending. (World Bank, 2010, p.37) In the light of Deacon
(2007) it can be said that this reflects aptly on the Bank’s tendency to advocate for a
governmental social expenditure targeting the poor and only the poor.
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4.3.2. UNICEF's adjustment with a human face
In its annual report of 1987, UNICEF criticized the fact that structural adjustment
policies implemented in developing countries "did not make explicit effort to prevent
the worsening of child well-being and often contributed to a rise in the number of
people in poverty". (UNICEF,1986-1987, p.6) It stated that to advocate for
“Adjustment with a human face” an adjustment would need to protect the vulnerable.
Concerning the food policy, the report points out that increasing food prices, while
households’ incomes are diminishing, will create an aggravated nutritional status of
children in the poorest families. It further criticizes the consequences of structural
adjustments on nutrition; "There is now evidence that malnutrition increased and
educational attainment deteriorated in the 1980s in at least 16 countries in Africa
south of the Sahara, eight in Latin America, and three in North Africa and the Middle
East." (UNICEF,1986-1987, p.6) In a book that develops the concept of “Adjustment
with a human face” further (Cornia et. al. 1987), it is mentioned that nutrition
interventions, such as targeted food subsidies, are essential in a country where the
rates of malnutrition are high and they function as compensation measures when
macro adjustment is likely to generate an increase in food prices. They however
strongly recommend targeted subsidy programs. UNICEF does not only support food
subsidies in theory, they also work on some subsidy projects on the ground. This is
the casein Mozambique, for example, where they are now working with the
government to expand the national food subsidy program in order to include all poor
and vulnerable children.

They are specifically working on the extension of the

program to children who are responsible for raising other children which were not
included before. (Bloemen, 2011)
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4.3.3. The World Food Programme and Food and Agriculture Organization
Both the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) are mainly working in collaboration with the governments and which cannot
work without the agreement of the government of the country they are based in.
Contrarily to the IMF or the World Bank, they do not have financial means of
pressure. In addition to a normative function, in the case of the FAO, these
organizations provide policy advice and technical cooperation to governments. For
the FAO, general food subsidies allow a quick response to improve access to food and
reduce the impact of price increases. However, general subsidies are really costly and
are most of the time difficult to remove or scale down because it can imply important
political cost. FAO would be rather in favor of "self-targeted" food subsidies, which
are subsidies on products that are inferior. The principle of self-targeted food
subsidies is to subsidize goods that are considered of “lower quality”, these are goods
that people would prefer not to consume if they could afford other items. A successful
example of such a program was the distribution of yellow maize - which is a lower
quality good - in Kenya in 1985 during the drought. It means that the ones that can
afford it would still prefer to purchase white maize, which is a higher quality good.
(FAO, 2010) The preference for targeted subsidy programs is shared by the WFP.
They would, however, rather advocate for targeting by identifying the neediest users
through methods such as geographic targeting and proxy means testing.4 They are in
favor of a ration card with clear criteria and a regularly updated database of users.
(IFRI et al., 2013) Both organizations also emphasize that good safety nets in place -

4 Proxy means tests are survey conducted in order to determinate whether an individual or household
is entitled to receive a help from the government based on its need for this help according to a list of
specific criteria, like if they have a TV or how many people sleep in the same room.
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like an efficient cash transfer program for the needy - can help the nutritious status of
the poor and can even help avoid using subsidies, in case of price increases, the
government can scale up those measures. But in many developing countries, the
safety nets are really weak or non-existent. The number of short-term policy options
to protect the vulnerable is then limited. (IFPRI et al.,2013; FAO, 2010)

5. Data Collection (Interviews)
5.1. International agencies
The World Food Programme is an agency fighting hunger in the world. They also
care about the nutritional status of the people and food security in a longer term.
(WFP Website) In Egypt, it is therefore the main organization dealing with the issue
of food subsidy reforms as a part of their agenda for the food security of the
households and nutritional status of the population.
In order to obtain more information about their position on subsidy policy, I could
interview Noura Abdel Wahab who is an economist working as program officer at the
World Food Programme country office in Egypt. The following part comes therefore
mainly from the interview with Noura Abdel Wahab. 	
  
According to her, food subsidies play mainly a role of income transfer and
compensation that have protected the livelihood of the poor, especially during food
prices shocks. This system has managed to provide a minimal caloric income per day
to the population. WFP, however, also highlights a negative effect of this program
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which allegedly generates an obesity problem because of its composition (IFPRI et
al.).
WFP Egypt has a memorandum of understanding and good relations with Ministry of
Supply and Internal Trade5 since 2005. The Programme has been supporting them in
the food subsidy reform. In 2008, under the government of the deposed President
Hosni Mubarak, there were already some talks for reforms but the food rising
international food prices during this year made it impossible to pursue a reform of the
food subsidies at this time. There was, however, several attempts to enhance the
efficiency of the system and the WFP was in close relation with the Ministry in these
efforts. WFP has been approached by the government to conduct a vulnerability
report according to the criteria of WFP. They have done this vulnerability study in
2005, which touches the issue of food subsidies and access to food and gave some
recommendations which were taken forward by the Ministry like the separation of
production and distribution in the supply chain of baladi bread to reduce leakages.
Additionally, they did a supply chain study review for the baladi bread in 2009-2010
and they also worked on simplification of the chain. In the beginning of 2013, the
Ministry has started to reform the baladi bread supply chain. As seen previously, now
the bakers have to buy the flour at the market price from the state mills while before
the General Agency for Supplied Commodities (GASC) was procuring them the flour
from domestic and international production at a subsidized price. Now the GASC
establishes a market price for the wheat flour and bakeries have to buy it at this price.
Then, they sell it at a subsidized price and the Ministry compensates them for the

5

The Ministry in charge with food subsidies was reshuffled and renamed several times in the

last few years. The Ministry of Solidarity and Social Justice was created in 2011 after the revolution.
Then from December 2011, it became the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade.
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difference. This system is reducing the temptation from the baker to sell in the black
market the wheat that they used to get at the subsidized price of 60 EGP per bag of
50kg while the market price was 500 EGP. This is a first strategy to reduce leakages.
The second strategy used is to mix flour with corn flour which cannot be used for
baking other goods than baladi bread. The bakers are however not satisfied and accuse
the Ministry not to compensate them enough for the high price of transportation. They
are asking for 120 EGP while they receive only 80EGP. A study conducted by WFP
and CAPMAS found however that their actual cost would be only 65 EGP. The
reason of their anger might well be the loss of benefits - obtained through selling flour
to the black market - generated by the reform. The Ministry has, however, adopted
only part of the recommendations given by WFP. The agency advised that the role of
GASC which procures all the wheat should be more challenged by private actors; if
the subsidies are moved to the bakeries, they should let the free market operate and
GASC should keep a strategic stock only to play a role of price regulator. This shows
the influence brought by the WFP but illustrates also that the decision of whether and
how to apply those recommendations remain fully in the hand of the Ministry of
Supply.

Concerning the rationed subsidized items, a new system of smart card replacing the
paper ration card has been introduced to 20 % of the ration card holders and it is
aimed to replace completely the paper ration card. Using this numeric card that can
contain more information about its user that a paper one, was also part of the WFP
recommendations in 2005. WFP is in favor of the smart card rationing the food
subsidies which is an efficient system for the Egyptian situation, the program needs,
however, to be better targeted in order to include a bigger part of the poor and exclude
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the non-needy. The composition of the subsidized food basket also has to be changed
to improve its nutritional quality - adding for instance beans and lentils and removing
tea. (World Food Programme, 2010) While agreeing both on the need for targeting,
the Ministry has set criteria and questions to evaluate them that do not convince the
World Food Programme which judges them not sufficient.

In contrast with the World Bank, the World Food Programme does not want to
advance number of how many people should be excluded; they prefer to leave this
decision to the Ministry. This reveals well the worry of not exerting a too strong
influence on the Ministry or to push for certain policies, the WFP wants to keep
mainly a role of adviser and does not want to be involved in decision making which
are politically sensitive. They play rather a role of support, capacity building and they
do not put themselves in the front line. They consider themselves as partner only.
Based on the vulnerability research conducted by WFP and its partners, Abdel Wahab
estimates however that about 40 percent of the populations need full subsidies and the
next 20 percent need a partial ration.

While financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF advocate for cash
transfers, WFP is not in favor of this option, they are attached to more the stable inkind subsidies because of the inflations rates. Cash transfers could replace in-kind
only if there would be a mechanism to compensate the price changes, which is
complicated because prices might even be different from one region to the other.
While highlighting the need to improve the system, in a report prepared for the
Ministry of Social Solidarity (World Food Programme, 2010) WFP states that “the
replacement of the in-kind subsidy of baladi bread and Ration Card commodities to a
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cash subsidy is not an appropriate choice if the objective of the GoE is to guarantee
the basic needs for poor and low-income groups in Egypt, in light of the inflation rate,
the global economic fluctuations, and the inability of the cash subsidy to be adjusted
annually according to price increases.” And to add that “a staggering 98 percent of
surveyed households prefer the current Ration Card system and would rather keep it
than replace it with a cash system. Only 2 percent of the respondents preferred
receiving cash instead of the commodities offered by the Ration Card”.

WFP

advocates for in-kind subsidies but with variety between the regions because the
preferences differ from one region to the other. The food vouchers would also be a
good solution; with the vouchers system, the Ministry is not the one procuring the
food, the people simply go to buy from the supermarket which is then compensated
by the state, while with the ration card, the Ministry of Supply is procuring the
subsidized food to tamwin shops which are distributing the subsidized items.

The relations with the Ministry suffered from repeated changes of cabinet, making it
difficult to deliver and have a good communication. This pattern affects the extent to
which WFP can have an influence on the policy. Although a largely good relation, a
mutual trust relationship and mutual knowledge need to be built and this is
compromised when the Ministry is not stable.

When asked what is the main source of pressure for the government, Mrs Abdel
Wahab identifies in a first place the IMF loan which puts them under pressure for
reform. She thinks that although it is less primordial than energy subsidies since it
costs less, the food subsidy system is also on the negotiation table and that even if
food subsidies are not a specific requirement in the talks, they have to be reformed
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because of the fiscal deficit. However, reforming the subsidies now is sensitive
because of the political situation. Fuel and food subsidies are a very sensitive issue to
the people so the actors in the power are very reluctant to reform it in the current
period because they fear to loose popularity and therefore loose votes for the
upcoming parliamentary elections.

5.2. Ministry level
In order to understand how the decisions are made at the governmental level, I
decided to conduct interview with officials working at this level. I had the honor to
interview Dr. Gouda Abdel-Khalek who is currently a Professor of Economics in the
Faculty of Economics, Cairo University. He served as Minister of Solidarity and
Social Justice from February 2011 to August 2012. He could therefore give me some
precious information and share his opinion on the subject.

First, when talking about reform, there is an issue of social contract; do the people
want bread available at a subsidized price for everybody in Egypt, for the Egyptian
citizens or to some Egyptians? For him this is a question that has to be rethought.
However in the immediate time what is possible is at least to reduce the leakages.

The need for food subsidies is the consequence of poverty. So the policy key is not to
focus only on subsidies but to have a national program to eradicate poverty, however,
Egypt is still adopting policies which create poverty. The example of Brazil is often
cited but in this case, a whole social program has been implemented. Then, Dr. Abdel
Khalek emphasizes the importance of focusing not only on the demand side but also
on the supply side. Thus, a program was launched last year to increase the country's
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capacity to produce food. Since the subsidies are also the result of poverty in the
country and two third of the poor are located in rural area, two birds could be killed
with one stone by giving the farmers incentive to grow wheat. The Minister of
Agriculture provided the farmers with high yielding variety wheat seeds which indeed
resulted with a very good harvest in 2013; According to the FAO website, the
government is expecting a harvest of 9.5 million tons of wheat for 2013 while the 8.8
million tons of 2012 were exceeding the level of 2011 by 5 percent.

The former Minister approves the current reform in the baladi bread supply chain
which was started under his mandate. However, similarly to the WFP, he thinks that
they do not go far enough. The way bread supply chain is working now is the
following; the General Agency for Supply Commodities (GASC) procures the wheat
from the local and international market and sells it to the mills at the national price which is generally below the international prices - . While before, the government was
providing the wheat at subsidized price in a way that the difference between the
market price and the subsidized price was so big that it was giving incentives to
bakers to sell the wheat on the black market. Now, mills buy the wheat at the market
price (2500-2800 EGP), they turn it to flour and sell it at the market price - wheat plus
their own profit - to bakers. The bakers bake the loaves and sell them at the subsidized
price of 5 Piasters and then receive back the production cost plus benefit from the
government. The problem in the current system is that the bakers lack liquidity and
margin because they have to afford themselves the cost of subsidies until they get the
money back from the Ministry. Dr. Abdel Khalek's opinion is that it would have been
better if everybody operates at the market price and then the government buys the
bread at the market price and distributes it at the subsidized price. With the new
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system, GASC should change its mandate and role and instead of being an agency
which buys wheat from national market or international market and gives it to the
meals at a national price, it could play a role of a gatekeeper for the country’s
strategic reserves. Its role would be simply to stabilize the market of grain through its
strategic grain reserves which would allow it to intervene in the market prices by
injecting wheat on the market when its price is high.

Concerning the reform of the ration card system, until now few has been done. The
only improvement is a change in the administrative procedure; before, every single
application for the ration card used to have to be approved by the Minister himself.
After the revolution this responsibility has been transferred to the directors of supply
of each of the 27 governorates.
There is an important need for reviewing all the ration card holders in the system in
order to actualize it. Indeed, some people use to fulfill the requirement to obtain the
smart card and do not anymore because their situation improved. Similarly, on the
ration cards for the households there are many users who passed away but who are
still registered. The Ministry estimated that no less than one fourth of the ration card
holders are not qualified for it anymore. However, this is a huge work and Abdel
Khalek said they did not have the time or the energy to make this under his mandate.
They preferred to focus in a first place on making sure that nobody is taking
advantage of the system and on preventing leakage.
In Egypt, the subsidized items on the ration card are rice, sugar, oil and tea. To
procure these commodities the Ministry of Supply puts public tenders and traders
provide those commodities. For example, in the case of rice, Egypt produces more
than its need of rice and an export ban of rice was introduced to make it available for
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the Egyptians. When it comes to subsidized rice, every month GASC announces a
public invitation to tender for traders to supply hundred thousand tons of rice and they
take the offer with the lowest price. But the problem was that there was a monopoly
of rice traders who formed a cartel to keep the prices high. The traders were buying
rice at the beginning of the season at about 1800 EGP per ton from the farmers. Then,
they would raise the price every month when supplying to GASC and at the end of the
year in July the price hit 4000EGP. What was done was to switch from monthly, to
four times a year procurements. In addition, the strategy was to have a strategic
reserve of rice which could be used to influence the market because GASC needs to
supply rice to ration card holders and if it does not have reserve it depends completely
on the price set by the traders. Consequently, if the traders are using a price which is
excessively high, GASC can use its own reserves instead of buying it to them. This
serves therefore as a mean of pressure against high prices. This “game” is, however,
very sensitive because, it requires fighting against the food providers but on the other
side, there is the necessity to get the food because the ration card holders need food.

It can be therefore observed that working on subsidy policies requires experience
learning. Abdel Khalek highlights also the importance of talking to the people. For
example, when they started the new policies with wheat, in the summer 2011, he
toured in seven governorates talking to the people working for the supply chain.
Advocacy is really important and collaboration is needed to reach a success.

Regarding international organizations, the IMF surely is a big player in this area.
Abdel Khalek deplores that evidences found in documents on the food issue produced
by institution like IFPRI - which he consider as useful and interesting- are sometimes
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used by the IMF to serve its own agenda, mainly to support the statement that food
subsidy is bad and is the source of many economic ills in addition to inefficiency.
Indeed, without supporting the point of view of the IMF specialized institutes point
out the weaknesses of food subsidy programs and their need for reform. Those
information can then be misuses by the IMF to support its own argument on the
inefficiency of this type of social program. Of course, nobody can deny that the food
subsidy system in Egypt is far from being perfect, but on the other hand it is still
necessary since Egypt has a big problem of poverty.
The IMF is pushing for liberalization of trade but Adel Khalek argues that if Egypt
liberalizes its trade completely with the rest of the world, it would not be able to face
the competition of the agricultural goods coming from the north which are heavily
subsidized. This would have a huge negative impact on the Egyptian farmers and
would therefore raise poverty. Then, IMF seriously opposes progressive income taxes,
however, they went heavily in favor of sales taxes and indirect taxes which are very
regressive kind of taxes because its burden falls relatively more heavily on the poor
people so this is not social at all.
The economist blames therefore the IMF for advocating for antisocial reforms which
would worsen the situations of the poor in Egypt. They suggest other types of reform
that would comply with the revolution's demand for social justice - for instance
putting a tax on the stock exchange transactions which is a sector generating a lot of
money but that is completely unproductive - .

With regards to the loan, IMF pretends not to have conditions but at the end of the day
the government will have to submit a letter of intent which has to be acceptable for
the Fund. The IMF talks officially mainly about reforming the energy subsidies.
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However, delegations coming to Cairo were always advocating for a move from inkind subsidies to cash transfers which would be less costly and that would be also the
occasion to exclude more people from subsidies, while those people might need it.
The former Minister thinks moving toward cash subsidies which are more efficient, is
a good solution for the future but with its situation of mass poverty, Egypt is not ready
yet for that. It can be noted here that Abdel Khalek agrees on the finality of the
solution of cash transfers, however, he does not agree on the way to reach it; for him,
even if that would be the most efficient solution it cannot be implemented in the
current socio-economic situation, this could be implemented only after having
addressed the problem of poverty in Egypt as a whole.
Until now, no agreement can be reached since the IMF wants to sign a deal with a
government with a solid and broad popular base to ensure the feasibility of its
application. On the other hand, the IMF also does not find that enough has been done
till now to reduce the amount of subsidies and to reduce the fiscal deficit.

5.3. Experts
Dr. Hania Sholkamy is an anthropologist who is currently associate professor at the
Social Research Center of the AUC. She conducted many researches on food
subsidies in Egypt and participated to a pilot program of conditional6 cash transfer
and has been working on issue of subsidies reform as a technical advisor to the
Ministry of Social Affairs. The program of conditional cash transfers that the Social
Research Center was developing in cooperation with the Ministry was stopped in July
6

Conditional cash transfers contrast with unconditional cash transfers. The first are delivered only if
the recipients respect some defined pre-conditions, like sending their children to school. In
opposition, the second does not require any other condition from entitled recipients.
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2012. This program was supported by UNDP which would provide technical
assistance like supporting the Social Research Center's cooperation with the Ministry.
The program itself was, however, financed by the GoE. It aimed to provide cash
transfers to the woman in the family who can prove that their children attend 85
percent of the school time.

For Sholkamy, there is a problem at the decision making level because there is a
fragmentation between the different levels, there is not a strong integrated cabinet that
takes decision and implements them. There is no coordination and long term planning
and monitoring. This has always been the case but it is worse since the revolution.
It is difficult to know which direction the Ministry of Supply want to take because the
government has been changed several times since the revolution of 2011. This implies
also that the Minister which takes the lead has each time to get familiar with the issue.
For example, the Minister Bassem Ouda, in position under Morsi's presidency was in
favor of moving to cash transfers but had no clue of what had been done before. He
had also political pressure since he was close to the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)
in power who had committed to rationalize the economy. On the other hand, the party
needed to keep its popularity, this is probably why they opened new registrations for
the ration card, even if this doesn't mean people are going to get it.
The international pressure plays also a role of course, but this is not the main point
because it is clear that, as seen previously, the system is not efficient because it is too
costly and it fails to fulfill sufficiently its social role.

She sees conditional cash transfer as an additional social program for the ultra-poor
for which food subsidies are not enough. In the case where in-kind subsidies would be
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removed, the cash transfers could be one of the compensation but this would not be
enough.

An experimental program of conditional cash transfers had already

successfully been implemented in some villages in different regions of Egypt.

According to Sholkamy, statistics are not a problem for a better implementation of the
food subsidies, there is the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) which
gives a proxy of who is poor and who is not, there is information but the problem
remains to decide who is poor. The Ministry of Supply in 2008-2009 did a registration
for the ration card which has 13 million families on it. This means that the problem is
not the data but the difficulty of setting a fair poverty line that satisfies everybody.
She also thinks that proxy means testing (which are usually used by the World Bank)
is no suitable for Egypt, because you need a self-registration mechanism and then an
appeal mechanism so that if you do not agree with a decision you have a chance to
appeal and have your case re-examined.
It would facilitate a lot the process to have universal targeting categories like for
instance, all kids below the age of five living in poor area or all person above the age
of 65 should have a cash transfer. To secure the livelihood of the people, more than
one approach and those approaches are needed and they have to to be simple and
transparent.
The way used until now by the Ministry of Social Affairs for the social assistance is
that people have to prove that they are poor which is almost impossible. It results that
for example, in Upper Egypt 75 percent of the households have not access to any kind
of social assistance while in this area, over 50 per cent are poor. This shows that
social assistance is not sufficient in Egypt and gives justification to the importance of
in-kind food subsidies as an additional livelihood protection.
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Regarding the baladi bread, in the new system the leakages of wheat and flour are
reduced, but instead the leakages are in the bread since the baker do not sell all the
loaves at 5 piasters but keeps some of them to sell them at a higher price. This is
already a little bit better because this system at least succeed in producing more bread.
Any system based on control and punishment is not going to work, they need to raise
awareness.

There is a big pressure on the decision maker in the post 25th January environment.
There are too many people on the ration card; about 60 million but what they get is
actually not much. Indeed, in 2009 the government extended the number of people
eligible for the ration card but reduced the subsidized quantities. The program is
valuable to people but it is not a good program in term of the way it is implemented
and in term of the composition of the food basket that is subsidized.

The most pressuring aspect for reforms is the fiscal deficit. This creates also a
pressure from the IMF but also of all other donors and investors who need a minimum
of guarantees. The only difference between the IMF today and the IMF twenty years
ago is that today they look at the outcomes, they do not tell the countries how to get it,
but at the end the budget deficit needs to be reduced. At the national level, it has
always been depending on the political ramifications. The subsidy regime is very
important because any failure can upset the people very much and generate unrests.
According to Sholkamy, there was a good political opportunity to reform subsidies
just after the revolution that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCARF)
missed. After the revolution, for example, there was a general good will from the
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international community, they could have contracted loans with the IMF with low
interest rates and apparently soft conditionality. At the population level, reforms
would also have been more acceptable at this time. Internationally and locally, there
was more good will and support at this time.
Another important element to take into account is legitimacy; it is very difficult for a
government to engage sensitive reforms without enough legitimacy. Mubarak did not
have enough popular support, and then came the army with a certain legitimacy which
vanished quite quickly, finally the Muslim Brotherhood, although they had a
democratic legitimacy proved to be more willing to control the country than to govern
it and this made them loose also a lot of credibility toward the population.

The WFP had a wonderful influence in enabling the government to move to a
different production circle and estimate the waste. IFPRI in 2007 did a study about the
ration card and its utilization. The government knows everything about the system
from a fiscal aspect but has very poor information on the social, nutritional or
economic features. The donor agencies like the WFP are thus very effective and
useful in compensating this weakness. Around the year 2005, the government began
to be interested about the previous aspects only because of the need to rationalize the
budget. The donors played an important role in enabling the government to learn more
about the incidences of their own practices.

Regarding the negotiation with the IMF, Sholkamy confirmed that the IMF is
suggesting an unconditional cash program financed by the World Bank. She
emphasize that the obstacle to a deal for the IMF loan is not only on subsidies but also
on many other issues like taxes, the political situation, etc.
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6. Analysis of the material
6.1. Stakeholder analysis of food subsidy policy reform
The Stakeholder analysis allows a better understanding of the relations between the
different stakeholders involved in food subsidy reform.

•

Primary stakeholders are the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Finance, the
WFP and the IMF.

•
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The ministries have weak relations and coordination between each other.

•

The UN agencies have a strong coordination of their activities.

•

The IMF and the World Bank have strong relations with the Ministry of
Finance, however their relations with the Ministry of Supply are rater
conflicting.

•

The independent research centers are providing information to the
stakeholders.

•

The Ministry of Supply has close ties with the World Food Programme.

6.2. Factors affecting the Egyptian government
Here it is important to distinguish external and internal factors that affect government
decisions on the issue of food subsidies. At an internal level, the government faces
many pressures that sometimes contradict each other. First, there is a need to cut the
expenditure in order to balance the budget deficit because the economic situation is
not sustainable. Food and fuel subsidies alone account for more than 25 percent of the
state’s expenditure7. (Korayem, 2013; Galal, 2013) Beside this, the state expenditure
goes mainly on debt services, public wages and salaries and the remaining budget
goes for diverse kind of public expenditure; including health, education and
investment. Costly and inefficient subsidy program can naturally be seen as suitable
field for cuts and for reforms. On the other hand, while necessary, those reforms are
very sensitive because they will necessarily affect a population that might react to the
loss of services. When it comes to food subsidies, it is particularly sensitive because it
touches on two of the three demands of the revolution: bread and social justice. The

7

Expenditure for subsidies are included under the chapter “Subsidy, Grants, Social Benefits” which
account for about 30 percent of the State’s Public Budget. (Ministry of Finance, 2012)
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reform has therefore to be very well conducted to avoid the risk of worsening the
economic and social situation of the most vulnerable parts of the population. Finally
there is a political aspect that plays a very important role in the post-revolutionary
context. After the toppling of Hosni Mubarak, the country has yet to build itself again,
it has no democratic tradition and the country thus lacks experience of democratic
participation. Any actor taking power has to undergo a lot of pressure and resistance
from an opposition that would not miss any opportunity to criticize its actions. In a
situation of political transition, stability is a difficult goal. Hence any government is
reluctant to take unpopular decisions that might jeopardize its stability and survival.
Furthermore, there is a strong ongoing struggle for power, so any mistake might make
one party loose popular support and would signify a loss of power. A fact that could
be very harmful, considering the perspective of legislative or presidential elections.

When it comes to the international pressure, clearly the biggest pressure is the one
stemming from donors and investors, which are both represented by the IMF. Indeed,
an agreement on the IMF loan would be kind of a green light for other donors to lend
money to Egypt and for investors to invest in the country, as it would give them a sort
of guarantee of the country's solvency. Even if there are no conditions to the loan, any
measures taken to improve the macro-economic situation, has to suit IMF ideology.
Since they are not in favor of high taxes, which for them distort the market because
they are a disincentive for production, the main measure that can be taken is cutting
public expenditures. As noted above, subsidies are probably the budget line where
there is most room for reforms and cuts. Even if food subsidies represent fewer
expenses than fuel subsidies, the IMF is nevertheless pushing for reforms that would
lead to a shift towards cash transfers. On the other hand, the Ministry of Supply is
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closely advised by the World Food Programme that is not in favor of a total shift to
cash transfers. The WFP defends the necessity of in-kind food subsidies. It eventually
plays a role of balance. It is also the organ that advocates for the population. Their
priority is the food security of households. They are not looking at the fiscal aspect in
detail, but rather on the effect on the ground and on populations. They do not have a
means of pressure in order to influence the government. But their main concern being
the population, the government readily listens to them because the population's will is
a big pressure in the decision-making process.

6.3. Position of international agencies
The IMF is in favor of a food subsidy reform because they do not find the actual
program to be efficient and highlight that it fails to accomplish its mission since the
poor benefit only partly of it. In addition to their high cost, extended social public
policies, like the one conducted for subsidies in Egypt, distort the market. They
advocate replacing it with a cash transfer for the poorest part of the population, which
would reduce spending considerably.

The World Bank holds a similar opinion; they severely criticize the inefficiency of the
current system with its huge leakages. Although they support the idea of cash-transfer
in general, they do also recognize the necessity of in-kind food subsidies, but are still
in favor of excluding 40 to 60 percent of the population from those benefits.

The World Food Program endorses the need for reforms in the food subsidy system in
Egypt. They agree on the need of better targeting in order to include the poor that are
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excluded from the program and to exclude the rich who benefit from subsidies they do
not need. However, they still emphasize on the necessity of in-kind food subsidies in
the current situation. A cash transfer system alone would not be able to respond to the
irregularity of food prices and a system of adaptation would be very complicated to
implement since the price can vary widely from one region to the other. They think
however that the composition of the subsidized basket should be modified in order to
bring better nutritional value; it should also take into account the regional preferences.
They are also active in a campaign of bread fortification, which aims to enhance the
nutritional quality of the subsidized baladi bread.

6.4. Negotiation positions between IMF and the Egyptian government
The negotiations between the government of Egypt and the IMF have been taking
place since 2011. Until the day this work is being finalized, no agreement has been
reached. In a first place, the SCAF refused an agreement with a low interest rate of
only 1.5 percent and favorable terms. This can probably be explained by the bad
reputation of the IMF in Egypt and the unwillingness of the SCAF as an interim
government at that time to take important decisions. Indeed, the SCAF justified their
refusal by the reluctance of the population to borrow from the IMF again. Probably, as
they were here only as a transitional government, the SCAF just did not want to risk
taking an unpopular decision or even just an important decision. Then, when the
Muslim Brotherhood came to power, having to deal with the very ill economic
situation of the country, they reengaged in negotiations for a 4.8 billion dollar loan.
However, the situation has changed and the conditions of the loan became less
favorable. The IMF would not accept any agreement without sufficient adjustment
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measures that would guarantee an improvement of the fiscal deficit. Two main
reasons, both political, can be identified to explain why no agreement has been
reached yet. First, the Muslim Brotherhood in power was very reluctant to take
economic measures such as reforming the subsidy system, because they feared to
loose popularity in light of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Furthermore,
because the government of Mohamed Morsi was already weak and suffering from
instability, cuts in public spending might have threatened his position. Second, the
IMF was not ready to sign an agreement with a government that was isolated from
other political powers. In the absence of a broad based political will, the IMF feared
that the structural adjustment cannot be implemented. This is why in Spring 2013 they
started to meet with opposition figures to discuss the loan. Regarding food subsidies
in the negotiation, it is difficult to evaluate to which extent they are important in them.
Surely, the reform of energy subsidies is more important to the IMF, since it is a more
costly program. It might also be that talks on food subsidies are more sensitive for the
financial institution because it does not want to face the same accusations as in the
past, when UNICEF criticized the harmful nutritional effects of structural adjustment
policies on the population.
As said previously, the IMF looks more at the outcomes now. Most probably,
reforming food subsidies is not an explicit requirement for the loan, but since the GoE
is asked to rationalize its macro-economic situation and the current food subsidy
system being inefficient, it would necessarily be part of it. This hypothesis can also
be reinforced by the fact that the delegations coming to Cairo were always suggesting
a cash program financed by the World Bank as an alternative to in-kind food
subsidies. Food subsidies are therefore tackled in the negotiations between the IMF
and the GoE. However, they are not the main and central element in those
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discussions, but one issue among many others. There are many other reasons for the
deadlock of the negotiations besides the lack of commitment for food subsidy
reforms.

7. Conclusion
In the debate about food subsidies in Egypt, everybody agrees on the necessity of
reform and on the unsustainable character of the current system. The divergences of
all involved parties are about the extent of this reform. Furthermore, everybody seems
to agree on the finality of cash transfers replacing in-kind food subsidies, since such a
system is in fact more efficient economically. Yet, while the IMF is for an immediate
transition to cash transfers, other UN agencies like the WFP claim that such a
program is not yet appropriate for Egypt due to the high prevalence of poverty in the
country and the instability of prices. A cash transfer system would then not be able to
ensure a sufficient level of security for the most vulnerable part of the population in
the current situation.

Additionally, there is a general agreement on the need for a better-targeted system in
order to include the poorest parts of the population and to exclude those who do not
need subsidies on food items. This question is, however, very sensitive because it is
very difficult to evaluate who actually needs these subsidies and who should be
excluded from the program. Only the World Bank dared to bring numbers by
advocating for an exclusion of 40 to 60 percent of the population, this
recommendation was, however, very broad and is not clear on which criteria should
be determined who does and who does not need subsidies. The other problem with the
56

exclusion is, that it might cause a loss of support from the population to the program.
Indeed, people who would not benefit anymore from the subsidies might oppose its
fairness and legitimacy. This might actually be a reason why there had never been any
serious attempt to improve the targeting of the program. When it comes to
international agencies, the IMF might possess significant means of pressure for
reducing expenses on food subsidies which would be part of the economic adjustment
required to rebalance the budget in order to receive their 4.8 billion loan that would
open the door for investors in the country. However, organizations like the WFP also
have a great impact on the government’s decisions. Indeed, they are somehow the
people's voice in the debate; with their great field experience they have collected a
good knowledge of what the people need. The people being a great strength in the
post-revolutionary context in Egypt, their needs cannot be ignored in the decisionmaking process.

Even though international organizations have a certain influence on the decisionmaking, the issue of reforming food subsidies remains mainly one of domestic policy.
The political situation of the transition prevents any serious attempt to reforming the
subsidy system. No government managed, until the time this research is being
conducted, to get enough legitimacy to conduct such a sensitive reform. Actually, any
government that would start this reform would necessarily be criticized by its
opponents for its mistakes and its ineffectiveness and those, in turn, would be used to
destabilize its survival. There are too many strategic aspects in the current context
paralyzing any concrete decision. It will therefore not be possible to engage in any
reforms as long as the different parties see only their own ideological prospective for
the country and are not ready to cooperate for its overall well-being. The absence of a
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significant legitimacy and a broad political base makes it very unlikely in the current
situation for any government to being able to introduce a substantial, acceptable and
sustainable solution to the problem of food subsidies.

A solution to break this deadlock could be to create a commission on food subsidy
reform that would include representatives of every political force, of the Ministry of
Supply and the Ministry of Finance, and of international organizations like the World
Food Programme and the IMF. Independent consultants could also be consulted if
needed. Such a commission that would focus only on this specific issue could help
finding a compromise and going beyond the political disputes and rivalries since its
outcome – success or failure - could less easily be imputed to one single political
force. The positive aspect regarding this issue is that, currently, the gap between the
different political actors in Egypt is concentrated on issues like the level of
conservatism or the place of religion in the state; the issue of food subsidy reform is
likely to face smaller differences of opinion. Such a commission could help drafting
the principle elements of a way forward for reforms that should then be implemented
by the Ministry of Supply. Before the implementation stage, it will be crucial to
inform and prepare well the population for the upcoming changes in order to make
them more acceptable.
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